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TALKING POINTS: COLORADO AND AFRICA 
**Over the last half a century, transnational mining companies 
have shifted mining activities to low cost wage areas abroad~ 
like South Africa, undermining past improvements in wages and 
working conditions won by Coloradan workers' struggles. In 
southern Africa, they associated closely with South Africa's 
leading mining finance house, the Anglo American Group <for 
history of mining, see pp. 4-8; for role of mining and for South 
African links, see pp. 10-18 and Notes on Structural 
Issues ..• attached>. 
**In the late 1970s, Coloradan businessmen s peculated that 
their state would benefit from an oil boom. Real estate values 
soared, and office space multiplied. When oil prices fell in 
the 1980s, the state experienced a serious depression reflecting 
the decline in productive activities. Taking advantage of the 
state's lovely mountains, tourism has grown~ but typically 
provides low paid jobs to local workers. The state ' s efforts to 
attract high tech, along with increased military spending, 
further dichotomized the economy <pp. 18-19 and Notes ..• attached>. 
**Rightwing Colorado elements, pressing the Reagan 
administration to support not only UNITA in Angola, but also the 
MNR in Mozambique, led anti-union activities and exhibited racist 
tendencies and little concern for environmental issues in the 
Colorado. <pp. 19 > 
**In the 1980s, real incomes fell and poverty spread, 
especially in rural areas, but also urban pockets <see pp. 18 >. 
**An alternative program, supporting liberation and development 
in southern Africa, could contribute to full employment and 
risins living standards on both sides of the Atlantic. <pp. 2lff). 
--------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARIZATION IN AFRICA AND THE US SOUTHWEST 
INTRODUCTION: 
The growing US militarization of Africa 
affects the economic situation confronting the 
populations of the southwest United States in two 
respects: First, given the technological revolution 
that has shrunken the world's parameters, US military 
support for conservative governments seeks to open up 
the rich mineral and agricultural resources and vast 
low paid labor reserves of the African continent 
<three t i mes the size of the United States with a 
population of over 500 illion) to US transnationals, 
putting the wages and working conditions of the US 
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I. 
Southwest in competition with those of the oppressed 
workers of places like apartheid South Africa; and, 
second, the increased militarization of the US itself, 
including the Southwest, while enriching a few very 
large transnational corporations and counties, imposes 
both direct and hidden costs that undermine the living 
standards of the majority of people of the region. 
COLORADO'S BACKGROUND: To understand how US militarization in 
Africa aggravates unemployment and pover ty Colorado, it helps, 
first, to outline the historical circumstances that shaped the 
current dichotomous development of resources in the US southwest: 
A. The focus of the Spanish colonizers' North American 
conquest, New Mexico (including Arizona), lay on the frontiers of 
the Native American territories out of which, in the second half 
of the 19th Century, the Anglo American westward marched carved 
what became known as Colorado:l 
1. The Spanish coloniali s ts by-passed Texas to pursue the 
(contradictory) aims of converting to Catholicism the relatively 
populous sedentary peoples (especially the Pueblos) who had long 
before established a self-sufficient agricultural and handicraft 
economy and mined the rich mineral depos i ts stored in the 
mountains; and forcing them to provide mineral riches to their 
Spanish overlords. But they never conquered the Native Americans 
whose ancestors had for a millenium ruled in the territories 
f Lu~ther north. 
a. Back in the ninth century AD, the Anasazi, the 'ancient 
ones '-- cultivating corn and squash on irrigated fields, 
making pottery, and weaving cotton texties -- built 
multi-storied stone and adobe houses in the southern part of 
what more than a thousand years later became Colorado. By 
the 11th century, Cliff Palace at Mesa Verde had space for 
400 people in its 200 rooms. In the last quarter of the 13th 
century, probably because of a climatic shift, land erosion 
and drought, they abandoned most of their lands and moved 
south to the Rio Grande Valley - - the ancestors of the Pueblo 
peoples encountered by the Spanish as they explored northward 
in search of treasure. 
b. Over the subsequent years, more nomadic peoples, the 
Utes and the Apaches, moved into the Colorado, hunting and 
gathering food, sometimes travelling further south for trade 
1. For the following section, unless otherwise cited, 
Abbott, Colorado, A History of the Centennial State 
Colorado Associated University Press, 1976). 
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with or raids against the Pueblos~ and later the Span ish, for 
maize, squash and luxury goo ds: cotton cloa ks, featherwork, 
jewlry , and pottery. 
2. In the mid 19th Century, expanding wes twards to fulfill a 
self - proclaimed 'manifest destiny,' the United States came into 
conflict with and defeated the army of the newly independent 
Mexican government, taking over New Mexico, along with 
California~ Nevada, utah and part s of Co lorado and Wyoming 
essentially a third of what had been Mexico's territory. 
a. In 1857, as depression gripped the eastern US, a small 
band of prospectors panned small! pockets of gold from the 
banks where Cherry Creek flows into the South Platte, the 
present site of Denver -- and a flood of speculators poured 
through Missouri headed into the Rockies seeking their 
fortunes in the 'gold r ush.' Merchants built stores and bid 
up real estate •.. and laid the foundations of Denver as the 
center of Coloradan life. 
b. Native American opposition to the occupation of their 
land, accompanied by efforts to trade and raids, led to US 
army policies of coercing them into r eserves (an idea later 
adopted by South Africans in setting · up reserves that became 
the 'bantustans'). By an 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie, the 
Cheyenne, and other tribes rened in joint control of the 
territory between the trails to Oregon and Santa Fe -- but 
now the Anglo Americans sought to confine them further : 
i. Reflecting the racist perspectives underlying these, 
Commander of the California Column Carleton, who assumed 
control of the Department of New Mexico in the 1860s, 
supported placing Native American s on reservations which 
"~'J ill be I sl;;:mds; and as time E!l apses and the 1~ ace dies 
out, these I s lands may become less and les s, until finally, the 
great sea <of white men> will engulf them one after another until 
they become known only in history and at length are blotted out~ 
of even that.1 ·fol~evel~." [F.D Reeve, "The Long Wc:\lk.1 " Ne1--J 1'1 e :·:ico 
1·-listol~ical F<eview, Vol. XIII, no. J. <.Jan 19~::.8).1 pp. 14 -:::::~s; 
republished in R. N. Ellis, ed. New Mexico Past and Present - a 
historical reader <Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1971>.J 
ii. In Colorado, Col. John Chivington, a Civil War hero 
and membe1·- of the Denver F;:epub 1 i can Par-ty, proclaimed "the 
Cheyenne will have to be soundly whipped before they will 
be quiet. If any of them are caught in your vicitinty 
kill them a~:; that i s the only way." --- and 
in 1964, attacked and slaughtered men~ women and children 
in a peaceful encampment of Cheyennes and Arapahoes who 
believed themselves under the protection of the nearby 
":!' 
·-· 
Fort Lyon. The survivors joined other Cheyennes and 
Arapahoes and attacked the Julesburg freight state and 
blockaded Denver, initiating sporadic warfare till the 
Native Americans agreed to move to Oklahoma. Even then. 
summer raids and rumors persisted till General Custer · 
mounted another dawn raid on the Native Americans camp 
along the Washita River. (Abbott, p. 77 ff.) 
111. The Utes maintained an uneasy balance with the Anglo 
Americans, but as prospectors made new discoveries in 
their territory, the miners wanted to push them back; and 
when, at the end of the 1870s, some Utes ambushed army 
troops called in to enforce the government agents' 
control, deported the largely peaceful people to Utah. 
Some 800 people remained on a resefvation 15 miles wide 
and 110 miles long in southwestern Colorado, but a 1895 
law parceled out part of the reseveration as private 
property to individual tribespeople, leaving several 
hundred thousand acres as common property. 
3. When Colorado's constitutional convention took place in 1875, 
the composition of the delegates reflected the territory's brief 
history, focused around the coming of the railroads and intensive 
mining business, as the Anglos who flocked to the territory to 
seek their fortunes, stayed to blast out and ship away crude 
minerals to fuel the post-Civil War industrial revolution. 
a. To ship essential equipment and men to the mines and the 
minerals to eastern factories required building of railroads. 
Winning the competition among the eastern railroad companies 
ensured Denver its place as the new state's capitol. New 
towns sprang up along the lines as immigrants, seeking jobs 
on the mines or responding to speculative land companies' 
advertisements, moved in to farm-- and the territory's 
population multiplied from 40,000 to almost 200,000. 
b. To mine and smelt the Rockies' minerals, locked in 
underground veins, required capital equipment and machinery 
which the pioneer miners lacked -- and Colorado boosters 
attracted British as well as eastern US capital to set up 
mining companies. 
i. The discovery of silver at Leadville pushed up mineral 
production sixfold to over $23 million by 1880; but 
overexpansion led to a crash and consolidation of 
independent smelters into a few larger firms, and with the 
coming of the railroad Leadville grew into Colorado ' s 
second largest city. 
ii. Leading Coloradans made money speculatively buying 
and selling mine properties, while growing mining companies 
consolidated and built large centralized smelters in Denver 
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and Pueblo (the latter built by the Guggenheim family from 
its profits from its Leadville mines). In 1899, the 
American Semlting and Refining co., backed by Rockefeller 
oil money, absorbed six of Colorado's largest plants and, 2 
years later, exchanged a third of its shares for control of 
Guggenhiem's properties, using control of smelters to 
dominate the metal mining industry. 
111. From the start, centered around providing fuel for 
railroads and smelters, the growth of coal mining involved 
corporate enterprise. The largest railroad enterprise 
planted the seed for Colorado's most important corporation, 
the Colorado Fuel and Iron Co <CF&I) that, by 1992, owned 
69,000 acres of coal land that provided 45% of the state's 
output, two iron mines, and the only integrated steel plant 
in the West. Over the next decade, it absorbed smaller 
coal mines to raise its share to 75% of Colorado coal 
production, and tripled its steel output with the help of 
pooling agreements with Carnegie Steel and Federal Steel. 
From Wyoming to New Mexico, CF&I employed 15,000 men. But 
in withstanding a takeover bid by US Steel, CF&I came close 
to bankruptcy, and Rockefeller took control, annexing 
colorado's largest business to the nation's biggest 
financial empire. 
c. Politics, predominantly Republican, centered around the 
mines and railroads, with leading mining figures ' buying' 
their opportunity to run for key state offices . Through 
subsidies, contracts and laws favorable to business, they 
viewed the state government's task as promotion of economic 
growth. 
i. Despite the emergence of Granger movement, reflecting 
the opposition of farmers and mine workers to the growing 
domination by mine companies and railroads, the 
constitutional convention rejected efforts to regulate 
railroad rates, granted the mine industry a ten year tax 
exemption, and agreed to aid scientific investigation. 
11. Over the next two decades, legislators rejected 
legislation that might negatively impact the mine 
companies, in 1883 repealing a 1877 law prohibiting child 
labor on the mines and providing safety measures; and 
repeatedly refused to control railway rates in the interest 
of the farmers. 
4. To sell the land granted by the federal government to finance 
the railroads, the companies stimulated the creation of companies 
to irrigate the eastern Coloradan plains for 
farmi ng. 
i. Homesteaders' attempts to introduce dryland farming 
failed with years of cyclical bad rainfall~ between 1890 
and 1900, the population of some eastern counties dropped 
by as much as 40%. (The cycle repeated itself in the 
1930s, when drought years turned much of eastern Colorado 
into part of the mid-western Dust bowl, causing the exodus 
of 15% of the farmers, and again in the mid -50s, although 
by the latter date government measures, including 
providing crop insurance, price regulation, subsidies, and 
research, softened the impact. Nevertheless, family farms 
steadily gave way to large corporate farms that could 
afford the heavy capital investment in irrigation and 
mechanized farming. 
ii. Resolution of the debate over water rights, 
incorporated in the constitution, gave priority to 
agricultural purposes, laying the basis for the state ' s 
agricultural future, with heavy federal investment in 
irrigation facilities, i n cl uding tunnels to bring mountain 
waters to the plains (eg, the 1904 Gunnison River project; 
the 1912-17 addition of a 62 mile canal, financed by 
additional land grants the 1937- 1954 Colorado-Big Thompson 
Project that included a 13 mile tunnel under Rocky Mountain 
Park to provide hydro-electric power and water for 9 
counties; and the $200 million 1964-mid '70s Frying 
Pan-Arkansas project to provide water for Colrado Springs 
townspeople). Government suppor ted irrigations 
facilitaties spurred th e state ' s exports of wheat and s ug ar 
beets, the raw materi al for giant sugar refining companies 
set up the the assistance of the American Sugar and 
Refining Company trust, and later the Great Western Sugar 
Company - which together with the railroad companies led 
the lobbying effort for diversion of water across the 
Continental Divide. 
ii. Cattle ranching developed as stock men brought herds to 
the Colorado rail line for the eastern markets, each ranch 
on public lands controlled by ownership of water rights, 
with state regulations that opened a new field for European 
investors. Late 19th C. overstocking caused droughts, 
accompanied by a decline in beef prices, that led to more 
sedentar y ranches with havy capital investments in fencing, 
wells and windmills, and controlled breeding programs for 
better access to the markets. These fed into the Denver 
complex of stockyards, flour mills and Armour and Swift packing 
plants that helped raise manufacturing value added from 18% 
in 1910 to nearly 30% by the beginning of world war II. 
5. "A Generation of Industrial Warfare" <P1bbott, p. 124): {~s the 
mine companies consolidated and linked up with eastern finance 
ca~ital, employing larger and larger numbers of men, the workers 
began to organize, facing the organized a rmed force of the state 
in their e f forts to win better wages and working conditions. 
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a. The Populists, successfully mobilizing and representing 
the mine workers (unlike those of the Great Plains who 
repres ented small farmers and small businesses in opposition 
to the railroads) won important election victories in the mid 
1890s. 
i. They elected Colorado's governor in the 1892 
elections; but the legislature refused to back his 
program, and Republicans focusing on his use of militia to 
support mine workers in a 1984 Cripple Creek strike, won 
the next election. 
11. Uniting behind William Jennings Bryan's call for 
unlimited coinage of silver in 1896, the State Federation 
of Labor called for the 8 hour day, abolition of company 
scrip~ liability of employers, and broader Populist 
reforms including municipal ownership of utilities, 
natioanlization of railroads and mines, a graduated income 
tax, and direct legislation through initiative and 
~·- ef erendum .. 
b. In 1903, a rash of strikes spread across the Coloradan 
mine fields, culminated a decade of union organizing as 
workers sought to enforce a law passed by Colorado voters as a 
constitutional amendment to support the 8 hour day. 
i. In a state split between pro-business and union forces, 
the governor sent in more than 1000 National Guardsmen to 
Colorado City and several mining towns to 'protect' mine 
property and strike breakers as the Western Federation of 
Miners conducted a several month-lang strike to win an 8 
hour day for its smelter workers in Colorado City, and 
Cripple Creek miners walked out in a sympathy strike in 
mine towns up in the mountains. Armed soldiers arrested 
the staff of the Victor Record as 'prisoners of war' for 
detailing the criminal records of several guardsmen on 
active duty. 
ii. On Dec. 4, 1903, the governor declared Teller County 
in a "state of i nsLwrect ion and rebellion" and imposed 
martial law an Cripple Creek. the National Guard 
prohibited large gatherings, mounted raids to gather hidden 
firearms and declared criticism of the guard illegal. 
Strikebreakers reopened the mines, and a massive explosion 
in the Independence railroad station killed 13 nonunion 
mine workers. Troops questioned 1,569 men and shipped 238 
out of the district. The Mine Owners' Association 
mobilized strike breakers to destroy union property and 
banish mare 'agitators.· 
i i i . The United Mine Workers closed down the mines in the 
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southern Colorado coal fields to enforce safety laws as 
underground explosions killed or crippled 300 men, mainly 
workers among the 9,000 workers in Las Animas and Huerfano. 
Using methods like those in Cripple Creek and Idaho 
Springs, the National Guard deported dozens of men, 
effectively clearing the town of unionists and reopening 
the mines with scab labor. Ten years later, in 1913, 
United Mine Workers again struck for six months, demanding 
an 8 hour day. They moved their families in snow and sleet 
from company houses to tent colonies on the open plains. 
Again, the governor (another one of the same stripe) sent 
in National Guard which used infantry regiments and three 
troops of cavalry to harass unionists, detaining nearly 200 
union leaders and raiding the strikers' camps. The strike 
ended when the National Guard opened an attack on the 
Ludlow tent colony 18 miles from Trinidad, routing 
defenders from protected positions behind the camp with 
machine guns, burning the camp -- a nd killing 5 strikers, a 
boy, and 2 women and 11 children who choked on smoke in a 
celler under one of the tents. In the 10 days of civil war 
that fol lowed, 1,000 armed miners fought pitched battles 
with company guards and state troops, taking over the town 
of Trinidad and laying siege to better protected mines. 
Finally President Wilson assigned 1,600 federal troops to 
souther n Colorado to disarm everyone, including the 
militia, comp an y guards and the mines . Attention focused 
on Rockefeller, the absentee owner of CF&I who had 
apparently approved every step taken by state authorities. 
6. The boom in Colorado mining spurred by World War I collapsed 
after the war as industrial demand declined and transnati o nal 
mining firms began to shift their production to overseas sources 
with lower labor costs in a pattern similar to that which 
affected the national economy in the post-World War II era. 
a. The industrial demand for minerals dropped dramatically: 
i. copper and zinc output dropped 70%; 
11. new molybdenum mines shut completely; 
iii.Tungsten from China, vanadium from the Belgian Congo 
(now Za ire) ruined Colorado producer s; 
iv. the increased use of natural gas and petroleum 
weakened Colorado's coal industry; 
v. The value of gold and silver mined in the state fell 
75%. 
b. The post war depression spurred a militant anti-unionism and 
racism: 
i. The Palmer raids against the 'Red Menac e '' led to a 
roundup of allegedly suspicious progressives across the 
nation, including Colorado. In 1920, a conflict between 
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strikebreakers and union members resisting a wage cut by 
the Denver Tramway Company led to 7 deaths when 
strikebreakers fired into union members surrounding their 
barracks. 
11. The Ku Klux Klan came to Colorado, parading and 
burning crosses openly, and supporting victorious 
Republican candidates for offices up to the governor; 
A coalition of Democrats and Republicans from the eastern 
plains (less supportive of the KKK) resisted passage of 
KKK legislation, and counter - attacked to expose the Grand 
Wisard's financial manipulations, resulting in a jail 
sentence and fine. The Denver KKK members withdrew from 
the national organization and faded away. 
c. The Great Depression deepened poverty in Colorado, but 
state officials resisted New Deal measures, while Colorado 
business organizations emphasized self-help and opposition to 
high taxes and federal intervention. 
d. World War II revived Denver and Colorado Springs: 
i. The establishment of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and 
the Denver Ordnance Plant provided new contracts for 
rubber goods and fabricated metals, while the war economy 
renewed demand for industrial metals, especially the 
Climax molybenum and Boulder County tungsten for steel 
manufacture. 
ii. The Federal Government built Lowry Field, Fitzsimmons 
Army medical Center, Fort Carson, and Peterson Field into 
major installations. Military payrolls climed from $3 
million to $152 million, accounting for 12% of all 
personal income in the state. 
7. Two decades of prosperity after World War II completed the 
transformation of Colorado ' s economy along lines the presaged 
that of the nation in the 1970s and '80s: 
a. In 1930, farming and mining accounted for 32% of total 
employment, manufacturing for 9%, and government, trade and 
services for 40%. By 1962, the figures were 9, 14 and 60% 
respectively. 
i. A 1950s uranium boom in the Gunniston region 
collapsed in the 1960s. 
ii. The anticipated oil boom of the late 80s failed to 
materialize. 
b. Colorado's climate brought tourism and 'footloose' 
high tech industries, whose managers could choose attractive 
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environments for their plants: 
i. Hewlettt-Packard, IBM, Honeywell, Sundstrand, Ball 
Brothers Research, Johns-Manville and Beech Aircraft 
migrated to the foothills. 
11. As new skilled personnel immigrated, Colorado 
ranked first among all states in proportions of college 
graduates and political leaders dreamed an expanded high 
tech complex along the Front Range would soon rival 
Massachusetts Route 128 and the San Francisco Bay area. 
iii. With its central location and distance from other 
major cities, Denver dominated finance, transporation and 
storage throughout the entire region. It emerged as the 
largest comemrcial banking center between Kansas and the 
Pacifice, aiding its growth as a distribvuting and 
administrative center and extending its influence into 
parts of New Mexico, Utrah, and South Dakota. Denver is 
a secondary capital for the national government, housing 
state or regional office of approximately 150 federal 
agencies with a civilian employment of 20,000 in Denver 
and 30,000 statewide 
iv. A speculative construction boom overbuilt downtown 
Denver into swank glass-and-concrete high rises that 
failed to provide adequate employment or higher incomes 
for most of the older inhabitants. 
d. Colorado's politics changed, reflecting its changing 
circumstances and new high skilled immigrant population: 
i. In 1958, the AFL-CIO together with the Farmers ' 
Union defeated a Republican Right to Work law, and 
elected a Democratic governor and Assembly majority. 
ii. Four years later, the Republicans swept the 
Democrats out of office. 
111. In the 1970s, political concensus collapsed as 
environmental issues came to the fore, and Coloradans 
began to question the consequences of rapid growth: the 
boom brought money to real estate men and made paper 
fortunes for outsiders, but the devastation of the 
landscape, disruption of ranching and tourism, the 
imposition of demands for new roads, schools and other 
community servies on underfinanced local governments 
caused serious problems .•.• 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND COLORADO 
suggests reasons for and the impact of US militarization in 
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Africa, its implications for the future development in the US 
southwest: 
A. The post World War II technologic a l revolution 
facilitated the growth of US transnational corporate investment 
in Africa, first to gain access to rich mineral and agricultural 
resources, using the cheap labor reserves (eve n lower than those 
of Latin America because of the disruption caused by centuries of 
the slave trade, followed by a hundred years of outright colonial 
rule>; and then to build manufacturing industries, especially in 
South Africa where apartheid ensured continued low cost labor 
al ong with access to southern African raw materials, markets for 
manufactured goods, and high rates of profit. 
<This background is detailed in Seidman, The Roots of Crisis 
in Southern Africa <Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1985> and 
Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast~ forthcoming, esp. 
Chs. 3 and 4) 
1. US mining and financial interests have long invested in 
s outhern African minerals, gradually shifting to sources there 
while reducing mining output and laying off US miners: 
a. South Africa's leading mining finance house, the 
Anglo American Group, began operations at the outset of World 
War I with the help of Morgan financial interests; and has 
since expanded its ties in the US through a growing network of 
corporate interests, including Engelhard <which provided it 
with Democrat ic Party links); Newmont Mining <which today owns 
Peabody, a leading US coal mining company, in partnership with 
Bechtel, which contributed Shultz and Weinburger to Reagan's 
Cabinet>; and American Metal Climax <AMAX> (see list of 
Anglo-Americ a n international affiliations in Innes, Anglo 
America and the Rise of Modern South Africa). In the 1970s, 
the Anglo American Group, operating through its offshore 
Bermuda base, MINORCO, became the second largest foreign 
investor in the United States, with controlling investments in 
a wide range of activities, b e ginning in mines and extending 
into finance, including the leading Wall Street firm, Phibro 
Salomon, with links to the Rockefeller Citicorp. 
b. Starting after the first World War, when Colorado 
mines were suffering depression, and continuing through the 
apartheid era into the present, in collaboration with US and 
British firms, the Anglo Group developed mines throughout 
South and southern Africa, including copper in Zambia, 
Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zaire <where it also worked 
with Belgian interest s >; diamonds in Bot s wana, Namibia, 
Angola, and Tanzania; iron ore in Swazi land and, in platinum 
and gold in South Africa; and uranium in South Africa and 
Namibia (in cooperation with Rio Tinto Zinc). Union Carbide 
developed chrome and ferro chrome mines in Zimbabwe and South 
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Africa. As US companies shifted to southern and particularly 
South Africa for their sources of these minerals~ they 
strengthened the basis of the argument that these provided 
"str-ategic" interests v-Jhi ch US policy must protect. 
<See appendix to this outline for U.S. companies with 
investments in South Africa and details relating to their role 
in the U.S. southwest) 
i. Companies like AMAX and Newmon t could close down their 
southwestern mines and import copper and other strategic 
minerals, including lead, platinum and vanadium <see 
Appendix I in Roots of Crisis) from their southern African 
mines where they paid workers a fraction of what they paid 
unionized US mine workers (see list of mining firms in New 
Mexico in attached list; many of these also operated in 
Colorado. By 1984~ however, most, if not all had cut back 
their southwes tern US production. ) 
ii. In the late 1970s and '80s, world copper prices 
plummeted. The independent African copper producers 
Zambia, Zaire and Zimbabwe -- having adopted western advice 
to expand copper instead of redirecting their copper 
profits to more balanced integrated economic development, 
experienced growing foreign debts. The IMF imposed 
conditions forcing them to devalue their currencies, 
further lowering their workers ' real wages to cut their 
copper prices, in a desparate effort to expand their copper 
s;aJ.es. 
In this period, employment in the Southwest's copper 
industry declined, and the US. firms, spearheaded by Phelps 
Dodge <with holdings in South Africa) in the southwest (and 
by Shell,BP and Fluor in Appalachia- see Apartheid and the 
US Southeast, op. cit.)~ renewed its attacks on the US 
mineworkers' unions. 
iii. When Rio Tinto Zinc began to sell Namibian uranium, 
mined under conditions of apartheid (with little or no 
protection against the effects of radiation) by workers 
receiving wages less than a fourth those of US miners (in 
violation of UN embargo against investments in Namibia 
until South Africa granted it independence) US mine firms 
stopped mining uranium in New Mexico and laid off thousands 
of woJ~kers .. 
2. The role o·f the US "majors" in African oil: 
a. As African states won political independence and improved 
communications and shipping facilities reduced the costs of 
long-distance production in the post World War II era, US oil 
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"major s" e:-:panded t.heil~ e:·:ploration and e:·:ploit.at.ion o ·f 
African crude oil in Niger1· ~ , Alge_~rl· ~ .. , L1·bya ~nd ~ 1 = , = , = r-;ngo a .1 
shipping it to their refineries at home or elsewhere for sale 
throughout the world 's markets. 
i. Initially, the US oil companies shipped away the 
African states' low cost crude, paying little in t.axes 1 a nd 
remitting most of their profits without regard for national 
development. With the advent of OPEC, the participating 
African states forced up world oil prices and captured a 
larger share of the res ulting investable surpluses, but, 
through their control of the major refineries and marketing 
networks, the companies reaped even higher profits 
attaining the status of the world's largest companies with 
incomes exceeding that of several independent African 
r.::ount.r i es. 
ii . Some African countries sought to reinvest their oil 
profits in their national development, achieving some 
success in restructuring their economies to meet their 
peoples' needs. 
111. The non - oil producing countries, their modern 
export - oriente debckaves dependent on oil for fuel and 
lubrication, had to spend up to a third of their export 
earnings to buy oil , regardless of the price -- a 
significant factor in their mounting external debt. 
iv. In southern Africa, Angola, upon attain liberation 
from the Portuguese in 1976, negotiated an agreement with 
Gulf Oil (now Chev1··on) to acquire shares in Gul·f: · s Angol.:m 
affiliate, and half the profits. In return for its shares, 
Gulf would train local people, provide the necessary 
technology, and refine and sell the oil through its 
international marketing network. 
a) Through Gulf, the US remained Angol a's leading 
trading partne1~. 
b) A member of the nine-state association of 
independent. southern African countries (the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference 1 SADCC) 
that sought to cooperate to attain development and 
reduce dependence on South Africa, Angola agreed, once 
it. established its own refinery capacity and developed 
the essential infrastructure, to provide lower-cost. oil 
products to its fellow SADCC member s 
b. The 'majors' made their biggest oil refinery investments 
on the entire African continent, not in the independent 
states, but in South Africa. There they made a key 
contribution to building up the racist minority's 
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mili t ary-industrial capacity to oppress the African majority 
at home and d e stabilize the entire southern African region. 
i. Ironically, South Africa has no oil deposits of its 
own; but it. depends on the oil 'mc:Uors' ·-··- Caltf2:·: <Standard 
Oil of California and Texaco), Mobil, and Shell - BP - -to bring 
in oil for their refineries. This they did, under a heavy 
curtain of government secrecy, despite the OPEC and UN 
attempts to impose an effective boycott. (Mobil earlier 
helped to evade the UN boycott against the then-Rhodesian 
government. which had unilaterally declared independence <UDl) 
to prevent establishment of majority rule in what, after 15 
years of guerilla war, became Zimbabwe.) 
ii. Shell-BP collaborated with the South African 
government-owned Sentrachem to build a petrochemicals 
industry, essential for inputs to industry and its 
growing military buildup. 
iii. The US engineer i ng firm, Fluor, constructed a giant 
oil - from- coal facility for the minority government's 
SABOL, designed to reduce its dependence on imported oil 
<its capacity remains secret, but estimates range from 
10% to 30% of South Africa's oil needs. 
<For details re Fluor and She l l-BP's anti-union 
activities in South Africa and the US Southeast, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 6) 
3. Manufacturing: 
a . All the independent African states sought to attract 
investment in industries to increase productive employment 
opportunities and raise living standards; but thr e e fourths 
of all U.S. manufacturing investment on the entire continent 
went into the military-industrial manufacturing business of 
apartheid South Africa. 
i. Essentia l ly, US firms began to extend the maquiladora 
concept to South Africa where, until the 1980s, the regime 
pursued policies that ensured them rates of profit 
averaging 25 percent. 
11. Increasingly, as anti - apartheid divestment pressures 
mounted, US firms shed their ownership of local plants and 
contracted ~·Jith locally-based fi1~ms (which they "sold" to 
the local managers or to the Anglo American Group) to sell 
them the mach i nery, equipment and materials, if necessary 
helping to finance it. 
b. US. firms sought thus to take advantage of: 
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CFor details re firms and their role in southern Africa, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4; after identifying 
particular transnational corporate affiliate in the southwest. 
look at the 1984 list of US firms with assets and employees i~ 
South Africa <See Appendix in Roots of Crisis, op. cit.>, to 
see if also operated in them.) 
i. Cheap labor disciplined under apartheid conditions for 
labor intensive manufacturing processes like 
*those of auto firms like GM, Ford and Chrysler <the 
latter two sold out to the Anglo American Group>; 
*textiles <In the 1980s, for example, Sears Roebuck 
could buy textiles from Taiwanese firms hiring workers 
in the bantustans for $7 a week, compared eg to North 
Carolina workers -- the lowest paid in the US -- who 
received $7 an hour; while North Carolina lost 43 
te:-:tile jobs a day, Sears could se::.'ll "Tai~t-Janese·-made" 
goods despite the unenforced US sanctions.>; 
*high-tech: eg. IBM sold its South African plant, but 
continues to sell computer technology to the South 
African firm under contract, and claims no 
responsibility when that firm sells it to the 
government <which, under 1986 sanctions law, would be 
illegal for IBM to de). 
ii. Access to South and southern African crude 
materials, produced by low paid labor in mines and on 
corporate and settler farms throughout the region and 
shipped in via trading networks dominated by the Anglo 
American Group. iii. Access to markets, including: 
*The wealthy white 20% of the South African population 
who could afford luxury durable goods; 
*Advanced electrical, automotive, and even 
nuclear-related technologies for the regime's 
military, expanding as it sought to perpetuate its 
oppressive rule at heme and destabilize the region 
<sales through local South African-owned firms enabled 
the US manufacturers to evade the letter of the US 
sanctions law>; GE, General Motors, Westinghouse, IT&T 
contributed these kinds of goods; 
*Improved technologies to enable the minority to 
develop industry, mining, agriculture and the military 
while reducing "dependence" on bla.ck labor -- a major 
factor contributing to growing unemployment in South 
Africa; firms like IBM, Burroughs, Honeywell helped 
make white South Africa one of the most -- if not the 
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most -- highly computerized populations in the world; 
mean while black unemployment soared to an estimated 
30 to 40 percent of the populations as almost half the 
black population struggles forsurvival without paid 
jobs in the destitute bantustans. 
*The neighboring countries, whose externally oriented 
economies remain dependent on imported machinery, 
equipment and luxuries for the elites, now produced in 
South Africa -- as South Africa exerts is economic, 
political and military power to coerce them to buy 
from it.. 
4. U.S. banks have contributed loans and trading finance to 
South African firms, enabling them to continue to finance the 
import of technology and the export of their products: 
a. Although the 1986 sanctions prohibits further loans, the 
banks have engaged in rolling over past loans through 
rescheduling them, thus continuing to make funds available. 
b. Among the leading transnational corporate banks with loans 
outstanding to South Africa, Citicorp of New York has close 
ties with the Anglo American Group; and in 1987 turned over 
its South African assets to that Group, presumably continuing 
to conduct its business through Anglo American channels 
(including MINORCO based in Bermuda, with which Citicorp has 
long had ties; Walter Wriston, former head of Citicorp, sat on 
the MINORCO board.) 
i. Citicorp, which accumulates investable surpluses from 
clients doing business in the US <like mining 
companies) makes over half its profits from by making 
1 o,:~ns overseas 
c. While not a major participant in this business, United 
Banks of Colorado did lend investable surpluses, gathered from 
its Coloradan depositors, to South African borrowers before 
1984. Whether it continues to finance trade is unknown. 
B. Increasingly backed by military intervention, the Reagan 
Administration's Constructive Engagement Policy in southern 
Africa aimed to sustain the conditions in which US "interests" 
could thus expand: 
l. It incorporated a two-stranded policy: (for detai 1 ~5 '} see 
Seidman, Roots of Crisis in Southern Africa, especially chs. 5 
and 6.): 
a. To encourage the South African regime to 
compromise with its domestic opponents to implement 'reforms' 
to eliminate the most blatent racist features while 
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maintaining the profitable economic status quo; 
b. To slow down change in the neighboring countries 
to give the South African regime time to achieve this goal, 
while retaining it s dominant pos ition throughout the region. 
2. In implementing this policy, the Reagan administration (for 
det a il s, see Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 4): 
a. Refuses to effectively implement even the 1986 
Congressional compromise sanctions against South Africa 
passed over the President ' s veto -- or even the UN embargo on 
military- related equipment (signed by the US)~ thus US firms 
may, under the flimsiest pretexts, assist South Africa to 
evade those national and international laws; 
b. Thwarts negotiations for Namibian independence by 
insisting on linking them with the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola; 
c. Provides open support for the South African supported 
anti-government contra force, UNITA, in Angola, some of it 
through South Africa in violation of the UN embargo; 
d. Built up a military airforce base in Zaire as a second 
channel of aid for UNITA; 
e. Prov ides military assistance for the Kingdom of Morocco, 
(much of which it uses in its war against the Saharan Peoples 
Republic), while Morocco provides headquarters for UNITA. 
2. The South African - US supported UNITA focusses on targets that 
aim to disrupt Angola's development and the landlocked 
independent southern African states' efforts to reduce their 
historically-shaped dependence on South Africa: 
a. UNITA conducts two basic strategies to deligitimize and 
destabilize the Angolan government 
i. UNITA attacks peasant food production and development 
projects, leaving some 2.5 million Angolans confronting 
s tarvation; 
ii. To thwart the efforts of Angola's SADCC neighbors to 
use them to import and export goods outside of South 
Africa, UNITA destroys Angolan transport network s , 
especially the Benguela Railroad, 
b. Coors (of Coors Brewery, the fifth largest brewery comp a n y 
in the US, based in Colorado) supports the Heritage Foundation, 
the rightwing group that pressed the Reagan administration to 
support UNITA, and still urges it to pursue a similar policy 
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in support of the MNR in Mozambique. Coors was one of the 
private citizens who helped finance the contras military 
activities in Nicaragua when Congress prohibited the use of 
taxpayer funds for that purpose. Other Colorado backers of 
the Reagan administration's support of UNITA included General 
Singlaub, 1984-87 president of the World Anti-Communist League 
-- an international extremist organization that recruited 
Latin American dictators, death squad leaders and avowed 
nee-Nazis - - and continues to serve as its US affiliate, the 
US Council for World Freedom; and Soldiers of Fortune who have 
recruited mercenaries to participate in regional wars like 
those in southern Africa. 
III. COLORADO TODAY: 
A. The way U.S. transnational corporations, now backed by 
increased US militarization, have taken advantage of the 
post-World War II revolution in technology to shift productive 
sectors to low wage areas like southern Africa has had 
significant consequences for the people of Colorado:[Unless 
otherwise cited, the following data is from the Department of 
Commerce, State and Metropolitan Data Book <Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1986.] 
1. Over the last half century, transnational corporate 
investment patterns had dramatically changed the structure of 
employment: 
a. As large scale irrigated farms squeezed out small 
farmers, the farm population dropped to 4.25% of total 
Colorado residents in 1970, and even further to 2.05% in 1980 
(for more information about the crisis engulfing family 
farmers, see Notes on Transnational Corporations, attac hed ... ) 
b. Mining employment, with about two thirds of the mine 
workers in metal mining, primarily petroleum, natural gas and 
coal, declined from 48,000 workers in 1982 to 37,788 in 1985 
-- about 3% of the state's total wage employment. In 1982, 
mine wages averaged $24,326, slightly above New Mexico's 
($24,249) and the national average ($23,661). 
i. US firms like Phelps Dodge, Newmont and Amax 
could obtain minerals far more cheaply mined by third 
world workers in places like South Africa or Namibia for 
wages a fourth or less as high. 
c. In 1985, manufacturing employed 195,458 workers, about 17 
percent of the state's wage labor force, 25% higher than in 
1977 (in contrast to a decline of -2.5%, nationally.) 
i. Most of this growth took place in urban areas, 
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aggravating the dichotomy between urban prosperity and 
rural poverty. 
i. High tech industries electric and electronic 
equipment, machinery except electrical, and transportation 
equipment -- employ about a third of Colorado's 
manufacturing workers. Traditional mining firms, like 
AMAX (an Anglo American affiliate), moved into 
semiconductor business through a subsidiary hiring 20 
employees. <Denver Business jotu~nal, 2/22/88) 
11. Printing and publishing and food and kindred 
products, both employing about 21,000 workers each, employ 
another fifth. 
iii. In 1982, Colorado's manufacturing wages averaged 
$16,264, roughly the same as the national average, and 
somewhat above New Mexico ' s, though somewhat below 
Arizona 's and Texas' since a higher proportion of workers 
are in food where wages are below those in the high tech 
secto1~. 
d. The non-productive sectors, also primarily centered in 
the urban areas , employed over two thirds of the privately 
employed labor force, but some paid considerably lower than 
ave1~·age ~'\!ages: 
i. eg the Retail trade, with 267,783 employees in 1985, 
paid an average annual salary of $10,757. 
ii. The 1985 slump hit Colorado's banks and financial 
institutions hard, giving it the 3rd higest delinquency 
rate the Kansas Federal Reserve Bank region. Six bank s 
failed as agricultural, commercial and industrial concerns 
found it more difficult to repay loans. <Federal Reserve 
Bank.1 Kansas District, July--·August, 1986: "Banking 
Perfor·mance in Tenth Di str· i ct States" by vJ. /R. l<ennton and 
K.l"i. Hecht. 
2. To main tain profitable production at home, US firms with operating 
in Colorado demanded that workers make wage concessions and 
give up 'fringe' benefits in return for continued employment; and 
conducted intensified anti-union activities: 
a. In addition to Coors support for the contras in Angola, 
Mozambique and Nicaragua, the Coors Brewery, from it s Denver 
headquarters, played a leading ant i -union role in Colorado. 
In 1977, its workers struck against the company's contract 
proposals undermining sen iority and work assignments. Coors 
brought in scabs who voted the union down. This led to a 
national boycott against the company which ended only when, in 
1987, Coors, seeking to expand sales in the union areas of the 
eastern US, agreed to let unions organize its workers again. 
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(Denver Post, Aug. 19, 1987) 
(i. The Coors family record in Colorado shows other 
signs of lack of community concern. Bill Coors made a 
racist statement which led the minority community to 
exert pressure to get the company to sign a pact with 
ethnic communities. Farmers forced Coors to withdraw an 
ad that they considered anti-family farmer. <Denver Post, 
5/5/86) Coors, together with Anglo American affiliate, 
AMAX Mineral Resources, refused to pay to clean up Lowry 
Landfill where an 18 month $1.5 million Envrionmental 
Protection Agency study showed chemicals they had dumped 
there contaminated groundwater 230 feet down, and was 
still seeping down to purer aquifers. <Denvers Post, 
ll/12/86}) 
b. Phelps Dodge, with assets in South Africa, mounted an 
attack on unions throughout the southwest region, destroying 
the union in Bisbee, NM, in 1983, and forcing the workers to 
accept wage cuts in Arizona's Chino mine when it acquired it 
from Kennecott. The Anglo American affiliate, Newmont, told 
its Magma workers in Tuscan, Arizona, they had to accept a 
20% wage cut or lose their jobs; they accepted. 
c. Under these kinds of anti-union attacks, union membership 
in Colorado only grew slowly from 224,200 to 235,800 from 
1975 to 1982, dropping as a percentage from 23.6% to 18%, of 
the paid labor force -- barely more than the percentage of 
workers in unions in South Africa. 
3. By the 1980s, Colorado (1980 population=3,178,000, 11.8% 
Hispanic, 3.5% black) was characterized by dualistic development, 
with a sharply skewed income distribution related to 
military-high tech development that benefitted a small percentage 
of the population; and low incomes and high poverty rates for 
growing numbers, especially among the Hispanic and Native 
American population: 
a. With a per capita income of $10,783 in 1983, (almost $200 
less in real terms than in 1979), Colorado still ranked above 
the average for the United States ($9,496 in 1983). 
b. Dichotomized development left the inner city 
populations and those living in rural (former miners, 
farmers, Hispanics and Native Americans and Blacks) with less 
employment and lower incomes than the average: 
i. About 9.4% of all urban Coloradans (285,000 persons) 
received below-poverty line incomes in 1979 (a figure 
that has probably risen since then - need data), but 
13.0% <72,000) of those in rural areas did not obtain 
enough to live on. 
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11. Reflecting Denver's dualistic growth in recent 
years, some 13.7% of those living in the innner city 
received less than poverty-line incomes, compared to 
4.6% in the suburbs. 
a) A visit to the Five Points area in Denver confirms 
the deterioration of living standards in that area in 
the 1980s. 
b) In 1987, Denver's employment dropped by 11,000 as 
the '84-85 slump spread from the high tech industries 
to constuction, finance and utilities. (D. Zuber, "On 
the Ropes" Denver Business, 9/87) 
B. Ths US domestic military buildup, necessary to sustain the 
kind of military intervention designed to ' open up' Africa, 
aggravated Colorado's dualism as well as introducing both direct 
and hidden costs for the state's inhabitants: 
1. The military spending in the region tend to be concentrated 
among a few firms and in a few military installations, thus 
aggravating the lop - sided pattern of state development which 
enriches a few and impoverishes growing numbers of state 
citizens (more information needed here): 
c. Hidden costs of these military installations include: 
i. the loss of tax dollars, since the vast acreages of 
land are exempt from most or all tax payments; 
ii. environmental degradation, as weapons 
use and production often impact negatively on the 
surrounding neighborhood; in Arizona, these dangers 
include pollution of both land and air since testing 
affects the air, and disposal of wastes may leak into 
surrounding soils and water supplies. These dangers 
require research. 
a) eg. An estimated 25 to 40,000 tons of chemical 
weapons are to be incinerated at a cost of $2 to 
$2.5 billion in closed incinerators at the sites 
where they are stored in military depots around the 
country, including Pueblo Army Depot in 
Colorado. <New York times, 2/24/88) An Army 
spokesperson claims this will be environmentally 
safe, but the Army has been known to underestimate 
environmental problems in the pas t. 
111. tax expenditures for schools, roads, additional 
health facilities and police protection for military 
personnel. 
<For illustrations of these costs from the US southeast, see 
Apartheid and the US Southeast, Ch. 10) 
2. Military contractors in Colorado include leading firms 
i. See Seidman, Apartheid and the U.S. Southeast, 
Chapter 10, for examples of the potential consequences 
of military contracts in contributing to increased 
capital intensive production, reducing employment; 
redistributing the tax burden; racism; and anti-union 
policies. <These possibilities need to be documented in 
Colorado.) 
3. It has been estimated that, from 1981-85, military 
spending cost Colorado a net loss of - 66,210 jobs, 
a. These job resulted from 
net investment opportunities foregone in the following areas: 
*Residential construction ..... $203,580,000 
*Non-residential construction.$352,470,000 
*Producer's durable equipment.S530,360,000 
b. The same money invested in (less capital - intensive) 
civilian production would have provided 66,210 more jobs, as 
well as more schools, roads, housing, health and recreational 
facilities to improve the physical quality of life of the 
state's inhabitants. 
c. In particular, institutionalized discrimination tends to 
prevent Hispanics, Native Americans and women from obtaining 
the high tech jobs associated with military production, 
aggravating the skewed income distribution throughout the 
state: 
i. From 1982 to 1985, blacks experienced a net loss of 
about 1,500 civilian jobs, while women's net civilian job 
loss totalled 22,800. <Employment Research Associates, 
474 Hollister Bldg, Lansing, MI 48933) 
4. Military spending not only cost Coloradans more than it 
brought them in dollar terms, but it taxed some districts to pay 
others, further aggravating uneven development in Colorado: 
a. In Colorado, overall tax spending on military exceeded 
gains, so, on average net taxes collected for all Pentagon 
spending (contracts and military installations) exceeded the 
net gain in terms of dollars spent on these items in the state 
by $704 million <Employer Research Associates, op. cit). 
b. Only in 2 Colorado districts, did per family Pentagon 
spending exceed the t a xes paid (by =$2,190 in #1, and =$3,340 
in #5). In four others, the loss per family (ie of taxes paid 
compared to spending) averaged: -$2,380 in #2; -$2630 in #3; 
-$2,390 in #4; -$2,930 in #6. 
B. To c ut taxes and pay for the growing military budget <which 
despite Reagan's promises have created a federal deficit equal to 
the entire growth in the nation's national product since 1980), 
the federal government has reduced domestic spending f or basic 
human needs, further ag gravating the negative effects of the 
changing international division of labor implemented by US 
transnational corporations: 
Need doc umen tation as to what has happened to federal social 
welfare programs as they affect Colorado, 1980 to 1987: 
IV. A PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVE to the present policy of 
militarization and intervention in support of the status quo to 
"open up" thinj '-'Jor·lcl regions like c=ifl~ica to US t1··ansnational 
corporate involvement could provide far greater benefits to both 
the peoples of Africa and the Unit ed States: 
A. The billions spent in building up US military capacity to 
police the world could be re-directed to providing productive 
employment opportunities, job training, better incomes, and an 
improved s ocial security safety net for US citizens, including 
those living in the Southwest. 
<For dollar for dollar costs of peaceful as opposed to 
military purposes , see Apartheid and the US southeast, Ch. 
11.) 
B. An end to support for repressive governments like those 
in South Africa, Zaire and Morocco, coupled with support for the 
full liberation and development of Southern Africa (and, for that 
matter, Africa) could open new opportunities for beneficial trade 
based on expanded purchases of US machinery and equipment to meet 
African development needs in t he context of mutually beneficial 
t1~ac1e. 
<For estimates of the mutual benefits of these kinds of 
possibilities, see ch. 12 of Apartheid and the US southeast.) 
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